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This paper proposes a statistical perturbation scheme to protect a statistical database 
against caDprani se • The propose d scheme can h.aDdl e the se car i ty of mmeri cal as well as non-
mmerical sensitive fields or a ocmbina tion of fields. Fnrthemore, knowledge of saDe records 
in a database does not help to caDprcmise unknown records. We use Chebychevs ineqllAlity to 
analyz e the trade of is be tween the magni tude of the perttttba ti ODS , the error incurred by 
statistical queries and the size of the query set to which they apply. We shar that if the 
statistician is given absolute error guarantees, then a ccmpranise is possible oot the cost is 
made e%pODential in the size of the database. 
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1. INTRODUcrION 
Trus problem of security of a statistical data base involves three hypothetical illdividDals: 
the statistician, whose interest is to obtain aggregate data (means, medians, frequency) frem 
tho data base, tho c.ner of the data wh> wishes to secure illdividnal records, and tho data 
base adDinistrator, wh> needs to satisfy both. TbtJ interested reader lIBy consult 
[8, l, 2, 5, 6, 7] for a survey of the problem and for further references. 
One p:lssible approach to a solution of tho statistical data base security problem is to 
restrict tho size and overlap between query set; available to the statistician. However, the 
major result of a series of papers is that "Ccmpranise is straightforn.rd and cheap", to qnote 
the oonclusions of [1]. Accordingly, it is saggested that 'The requirement of CCIIIplete 
secrecy... is oot consistent with the ~ui..rement of prodnciD& eDct statistical measures ••. 
At least me of these requiraDents IIID.St be relued ••• ". 
In this paper we stOOy alternative Sllutions to tho problem of securillg statistical data 
bases, based on randcm pertllrbations of tM data base. We quantify and IIllIllyze tho tradeoffs 
between "security" of the database and precision of tho data extracted through statistical 
queries, using Chebyshev's inequality. 
Secu.ring data through statistical perturbations has been previously considered; see for 
e:umple [8]. TIle idea is quite simple, mmerical fields in the data base are randcml.y 
pertUl:bed; a statistical query provides an estimator of tho required quantity. If a qlJery set 
is sufficiently large, the In of large IlIIIIbers causes the error in tho query to be 
significantly less than the pertllrbations of iIxlividnal records. The dangers involved in. a 
statistical pextutbation schaDe are: 
1. that the data base my be oampramised if the statistician is allowed sufficiently 
mmy independent est imate s; 
2. the statistician is not guaranteed error bom!.ds OD query responses. 
1A querY set is a set of records whose aggregate statistics is subject to a query. 
3 
Recently, L. Beck [7] suggested a statistical perturbation schaDe which parametrizes 
the variance of the perturbations. He demonstrates there that a proper parametrization 
guarantees the data base against a statistical ccmprcmise using limar queries. There are two 
limitations to this I118thod: First, protection is only proved for restricted foms of attack 
(e. g., linear queries). Second, the statistician may only be provided with statistical error 
guarantees (i. e., bounds on the variance of the estiaator used). It is IXlssible that the 
result of my specific query grossly deviates fran the actual valae of the ansrer. These two 
1 imi ta t ions are ~ed by the schaDe proposed in this !&per. 
To illtJ:odDce the proposed scheme consider, for CDIIIPle, a data base containing employee 
data ,are <:me of the fields indicates salary. Let g. ('1. ' ~, ... ,dn> describe the salary 
field of the n records in the data base. Let Cc( 1.2, ••• ,n) be a query set IlId let I C I be 
the IDaber of elements in C. A linear statistical query over C is the function: 
Th& values of individnal di can be ~rClllised in spite of query set size and overlap 
restrictions; see [1. 2] • 
Let us USmDC that ather than storing the actual vector A in the data base, a vector A' 
is stored, ,are..! = A' - A is a nndcm perturbation vector, whose caaponents are iJ::Idependent 
nndca variables whose 1118&D is O. Note that tmlike the sclltme proposed by Beck [7], which 
allows the statistician to obtain unlimited mlllber of sasple estimates to my given query, the 
perturbed data is fiDd for the full database and the perturbation is IDt changed fran query to 
query. 
Th& statistician may DOW IIBke any query of his choice, he may even acquire the vector A' . 
However, by properly selecting the perturbation, kD.owledge of A' does IDt constitute a danpr 
of cClllprCllrising the actual records.,g. On the other hand, the statistics of A' may be used to 
provide a fairly accurate description of the statistics of A. Note spin that since the 
pert1U:bation is fiud, it is impossible for the statistician to improve the estimate of any 
given query result by repeating the query. Therefore the concept of a statistical ccmpraaise in 
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thII sense of [7]. measuring the variance of the estimator of imividnal records. is a:>t 
relevant here. Tba cmly estimator available for any given record is its perturbed value d' .. 
1 
To fix these ideas. &SStJDe that the perttlrbatians e i are identically distributed with 
variance aJ and consider a linear qoery!le' Chebyshev's inequality yields: 
aJ Prob{la_(~') - 0-(.9) 11 eicil ~ -----
'-." I c I e l 
The left band side represents the probability that the error in the query exceeds saDIe 
bound. The right halld side bounds this probability in teIlllS of the variance of iDdividnal 
pe:r:t1ll:bations. thII error boaud sought !lid the size of the query set. The statisticiAn would 
1 ib to keep the probab il i ty of large error 5 in the re sul t of a query sall. whil e the dab 
base CJJmer wonld lib to keep the pertu:r:bations (i. e., a) in iDdividnal records large so as to 
protect individual records. The data base adDinistrator can choose a to satisfy both. 
To illustrate this solution. let 1lS consider a mmerical eDlllple. Suppose the average 
salary in the data base is bo, 000 and the dab base CJJmer wonld lib the stalldard deviation 
to be at least 2()11Jf. of this average. The statisticiAn. on the other hand. woold lib the 
error in queries a:>t to e~d h. 000. The data base adm..inistrator can set 0=4000 am 
r-1000 am thus guarantee the statisticiAn that the error ml <l(;(.9') - <l(;(.9) I exceeds 
h .000 with probability saller than 16/ I c I . Therefore the data base CJJmer can be fully 
satisfied that iDdiv:idDa.l records are adequately pertn:r:bed while the statistician gets his 
queries aunred within the required accuracy with probability which depends on the size of his 
qoery sets. The larger the query set. the szaller the probability of error. 
PlJt mother ny. the error bounds agreeable to the statistician. s. and the probability. 
1 - 5. that this error botm.d balds. depend on the size of the qnery set I c I and the SUlldard 
deviation of the perturbation (as deteImined by the desires of the data base arner) through the 
fommla: 
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Once the data base adninistrator deteIml.nes the right hand side. the tradeoffs between 
query sue. error bound and error probability are given by the left band side. This 
imquality gives an uncertainty principle among the error in queries. the probability of error. 
and the size of the query set. Also mte that the magnittJde of the perturbations in 
illdividDal records. maasund by a. lIllY USWllly be substantially larger than the magnittJde of 
the error in the qtJeries. The statistician t:.akes advantage of the law of large IDIIbers to 
increase the precision of the resul ts of queries by applying queries to large query sets. 
The above idea generalizes to an arbitrary mmerica1 field ~ in a trivial IIIllIJler. 
2. Variaticma 011 the Basic Idea 
A mmber of objections might be raised to the above protection scheme. We list foar of 
them and sbDIf bow our basic protection scht:me might be modified to meet these objections. 
(i) A first oojection might be that the error guarantees provided to the statistician are 
probabilistic, Given a perturbed data base A' • a query Qc(A') may result ill a large error 
relative to Qc(A). This lilly happen even when the query set C is very large. Chebyshev's 
iDeqll&.lity prmides an aSS1lr8.DCe that SIUlh an error is unlikely for a given query set and a 
rUIdcm pertlU'batiOl1. However. once~' is selected, clearly a large error is possible for saDIe 
qtJeries. 
If the statistician is mt content to live with occasional large errors, there is a 
variatiOl1 of the sclume. to be described below, which rill peImit the data base to be 
feasible. 
The vuutiOl1 is to maritor the error in the query I Qc(A') - Qc(~) I and to check whether 
it exceeds the error bound requested by the statistician. If the error bounds are eu:eeded and 
if the size of the query set I C I e1Ceeds a certain threshold size Do' set by the data base 
aOninistrator. then a correction mecb.aniSll is invoked. The correction mecha.n.ism simply perturbs 
Qc(A) by adding saDIe ra.ndan variable (with Q-mean and ~l-variance) llDtil adequate error 
boands are met. That is. we add perC C) to Qc(~) where I per ( C) I does mt e1Ceed the error 
botIIId requested by the statistician. 
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While this scllaDe may keep the statistician happy, the data base is DO longer secure (in a 
statistical sense). An attack on the data base would first identify query sets C. of size 
greater than no. that result in an excessive error and thus cause the correction mechanism to be 
invoked. We call such sets ccmprcmisins sets. Ouce ccmp:rcmisillg sets are identified. a 
statistical cauprcmise of the data base is easy. 
We illustrate this by an example. Suppose that the data base is perturbed such that 
A' :: A + .! where ~:: (e1 , ...• en) with e i = ::s aDd + aDd - arc selected with probability 
• S. Withont loss of generality, asstme that n is even, n = 2p, aDd the IDJIIber of + and - is 
p. Let evf!lry query be equiprobable. Then the average qnery length is 
n 
2 
Suppose that the error agreeable to the statistician is 
n 
2 
for scme (preStlll8hly small) positive E. DefiDe 
I (i: e i = +a}. 
ThIm III p. If eel aDd 
en Ici ) a = mu:(Do' I-I) 
2a 
then C is a ccaptoosiDg set. Note that a « n for no' 8 aDd a of practical interest. 
Let 
Let I 
Cj (iCj-l) &+1' iCj-l)&+2"'" iCj-l)a+a'ipl, j = 1.2, ••• ,k 
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......... n I cJ.1 = a+ 1, J' - 1 2 \. I C I J..... - , , •••• ~, k+-l 17""1 and C j C I. Thus all the sets C j are 
caap:roo sing se ts. 
SiDce Cj is a CUiiptcmising set we get 
x( C j) = Qc. (A) + per( C j)' j = l, 2 , ••• , kH. 
J 
Imwing x( C j) we <:aapnte 
x= ;(-X(Ck+l) + tX(C j ». 
j=l 
Let III = ip• It is easy to check that 
1 k 
x= dm+ ;.(- per( Ck+l) + Lper(C j ». 
j=l 
Chebyshev's inequality yields 
t k+l at Prob{ ; I-per( Ck+l) + x( C j) I 2. o} i -------
j=l k1 01 
Since k is large. x - dm is small with probability close to ODe. TIms x is a good approximation 
of ilia indivi.dllal tecord dm. This proves a statistical ccmpranise of the data base. 
Therefore the probl= of caupraDise boils dawn to that of i.demifying ccmpraIlisin& sets. 
Let as first mte that if the error botmd e is sufficiently small then !:Very perturbation 
schsIe has CUiptcmisin& sets. Iodeed. let C = (i: ei ) O}. Then 
<le(A') - <le( d) 
caapranising S4I t. 
If e ~ <L e i then the absolute error ex.ceeds ~ and C is a 
ieC 
We IlCW derive the caaplexity of identifying a caaptanisin& set for the eDIIrCle presented 
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a.bcNe. For simplicity we set the threshold size no = O. We first IDte that the lDDber of 
qnery sets for which the absolute error is s, i. e., I~(g') - ~(j.) I = IL ei l s, 
is equal to 
t (t) ( (i~ s) + (if s) ] 
i=O 
iEe 
due to (4]. The JDDber of query sets for which the correction JDechan.i:m is invoked, 
en 
i. c., s > -. is equal to 
2 
No 2t (~,) 0 2r= (2fl· .. {~J + 1. 
~s. i-O 






and 2 ( q(E:) ( 1 
Frail this we conclude that the probability of the query sets for which the correction 
mechaniSlll is invoked satisfies the imqaality 
Tlms, it decreases uponential1y to zero with Do This proves that almost &11 queries are 
ansIt'ered within the acceptable error bouDd and the correction mechaniSlll is invoked ertreme1y 
rarely. 
HOlt' bard is it to fiD:l a <XIdp1cmising set1 More precisely. wbat is the minimal mlllber of 
q1le%'ies to fiD:l a <XIdp1cmising set with probability 1 - &1 If we have k queries, k « 2n. 
the probability that &11 of ths are answered within the acceptable error bound is 
apprariately at least Cl-2q(e;)n)k. Tlms 1 - (1-2q(e)n)k is an opper bc:nmd on the 
probability of fimina a caaprcmising set. Hcmce k satisfies the imquality 
which yield. 
In 0 
k L ------~ 
In (l-2q(e)) 2 
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I n (--~ . 
q( e) 
This proves that ore has to lulve an elpOnential mmber cr queries to fiDd a alIIIranising 
set. This maDs a:mprcm.ising the data base infeasible. 
(ii) A second objection that might be raised to the proposed statistical seC'tlrity schaDe is 
that the perturlled vector~' requires additional storage. This is easily cirCtlDVented by 
perturbing the elements of ~ t:very time they are accessed. To guarantee that a given query 
always receives the same answer, the pertarbation of d i IIIKY be obtaiDlld using a pseudo randaa 
gemrator with a fUed seed which is given by SOlIe fimction of i. Therefore, ODe has a choice 
of either storing the perturlled values or CCDIpIlting thaD t:very time they are needed. 
(iii) A third objection might be that the perturbations of individual records should oot be 
ideDtica1ly distributed. For instAnce, in the salaries eDIIIPle above. a ;4.000 pertlubation 
IDllY be snitable to hide infO%lll&tion about salaries that do oot exceed the average salary 
( $20 ,000) too far. Howt:ver, if ODe of the salaries is h 7 S .000 I a perturbation of 
;4.000 does oot adequately protect the respective record. The discussion above umaed that 
a record is aapc.ised anly if its real value beOClllllls available to the statistician. This 
e~le mgests that an altenlative ootion of caapraltisability is required. Given a constant 
c, let ua defiDa a perturt:.tion schaDe to be nou-caaprallisable with respect to c if cdi<a( ei) 
for all recorda. That is, if the standard deviation of each perturbation uceeds a given 
fraction (c) of the _gnitlJde of the respective itea. 
Thi s probl em IIIKY be solved us ing a IIIll ti plica ti ve ra thor than an additive pertlJrba t ion. 
That is, the perturbed record d'i is generated by selecting a randall factor ai and mnl tiplying 
by die The perturbations caused by this process are given by ei = di, - di = di (aC 1) and 
are tJma proportioaal to the value of di • Let A indicate the di.gaml mtru fClDl1ed frem the 
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III11tipliers a i • The perturbed data is related to the origillal data through.9' ; AA. If the 
randaa variables a.-1 are independent IUId identically distributed with zero mean and variance 
1 
re spect ive1y. Clearly the schemD is ~ ccmpt ani sabl e (in the sense def ined above) wi th 
respect to any constant that does wt exceed a. Furthemore, Cbebyshev's ilIequality my be 
applied to obtain: 
where d detIotes the maximal element IIII\01lg the d i 
The tradeoffs analysis perfODled in the previous section th.1lS trivially generalizes for this 
11111 tiplica t ive pertllrba tion schaDe. 0 ne may general ize thi s last sdJ.eme to allow pertllrba t i ans 
by arbitrary randc:m mtrices. It has been shown by S.L. Warner [9J that this general 
"regression" pertllrbation of data might be applied to perturb ~mmerical statistical data, 
as nIl as COIlbinations of sensitive fields in the database. A detailed discussic:n of 
pertmbation through mtrix multiplication is beyODd the scope of this paper; such details are 
available in [9]. Again. the tradeoff analysis easily generalizes to the case of arbitruy 
(iv) A foa.rth. objection might be that the abO've pert-arbation scheme CIlly applies to linear 
queries. This obj ection is valid since salle queries (e. g., what is the II'4xima 1 salary?) 
canDOt benefit frca the effects of the law of large mmbors when ODe uses a statistical 
pe1tuxbation schmae. Frca a security point of view the perttl1bation schaaes discussed above 
offer w risk whml it COllIeS to an arbitrary query: the statistician my acquire a caaplete 
kDoIrledse of the perttubed values A' without caapremising the real data. However, the 
statistician my be tmhappy with. the answers if they deviate grossly frca the real val-oe. A 
possible solution is to generalize tho process used to an.swer objection (i) above. Given an 
arbitrary query, define its query set as tho set of records which are essential to the 8.JlS1fer 
(a record is essential to a query if its emission frcIII the database will change the llIUiIfer). 
Tbe lDOdified mechani. to haDdle arbitrary queries is invoked CIlly when the size of the 
respective query set exceeds salle preset threshold. It proceeds by cauputing both. the answer to 
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the query based upon the perturbed data and an answer based upon the real data. If the two 
answers ~iate by more than £ I c I, where e is the error guarantee provided and C is the 
respective query set, thI:m a new per1:utbation of the real answer is sampled antil the error 
bo1mds are met. An arbitrary query 1lIIY be represented as a function Q<"~) applied to the 
database. If the ftmCtion Q satisfies SOlIe 9DJOthDess conditions (e. g. • I Q(4) -
Q(4' ) I ~ K I ~i I where K is a constant). it is possible to generalize the results of (i) to 
prove that lXIIIp1a1lise is exponentially bard. A general proof is ~ the scope of th.i9 
paper. 
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